Consultation Hub

For comments on the proposal that the CAA introduces a Special Condition to be used in addressing the integration of a moveable wall into a mini-suite seat, resulting in a “PRM Suite”, in twin aisle large aeroplane interiors.

The Consultation Paper Special Condition UK.SC.D.0001 Issue 1 provides the full detail of the identified issue, and the associated Special Condition.

We received 3 responses.

The first response provided confirmation that the development of a Special Condition would not be applicable to the organisation’s designs or its products. This required no action by the CAA.

The second response proposed addition of further Interpretive Material to support understanding, and to further improve alignment with other global Regulators.

The third response proposed enhancement to the definitions within the text, and proposed wording changes aimed at making the text more specific to the crew operation of a moveable wall, and proposed to remove some text due to being unduly prescriptive.

We acknowledge the responses and thank the responders for their suggestions.

For the second response the comment is accepted and has been incorporated. Additional Interpretive Material has been included in the final SC publication.

For the third response, the comment is partly accepted. The suggestion of enhancement of definitions has been incorporated, and the text within the Identification of Issue section has been revised in the final SC publication. The proposal for wording changes and removal of some text considered prescriptive, has not been incorporated.

The CAA believes the context of the existing text to be clear and the parts subject to comment well aligned to that of other Regulators, and while the comments are relevant, the removal of the text proposed would also remove the intent of the requirement.

We notified our intention to update SC.VTOL issue 1, which had been published prior to EU exit. EASA published issue 2 to their document in 2024 in light of developing knowledge and harmonisation efforts with other NAA. The CAA has determined that our version Issue 1 of SC.VTOL needs to be similarly revised.

There were 2 external comments.

1 expressed support for the initiative and our work to harmonise with other NAAs undertaking similar projects.
No action for CAA.
1 expressed a concern regarding the various terms being used to describe this new category of aircraft.

The CAA notes this comment and supports the efforts being made to converge on a unified designation. We look forward to ICAO establishing a consensus designation at which point we will review how this could be integrated into our broader regulations framework.
Minor editorial errors were identified requiring “EASA” to be replaced with “CAA” in a number of places.

The text of UK.SC.VTOL Iissue 2 will be published unchanged, apart from the minor editorial corrections to replace “EASA” with “CAA” where appropriate.

We asked for comments on the Policy Proposal to make changes to UK Regulation (EU) 965/2012 to align with new standards and recommended practices introduced by Chapter 15 of Annex 6, Part I - Commercial Air Transport Operations – Aeroplanes. The proposed changes included Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material to support the proposed changes to the Implementing Rule (IR).

We asked if the proposed transition period of 21 days following the publication of the Statutory Instrument was acceptable.

To support the CAA’s understanding of costs that should be considered beyond the existent Compliance Monitoring and Safety Management Systems that are required to be in place by virtue of the Air Operations Regulations, we asked operators to provide estimates of what costs could be incurred for the adoption and implementation of these regulatory changes. We also asked for operators to consider benefits which could result from the adoption of the proposed changes. Such costs could include those related to transition and adoption of these changes, additional oversight requirements, training requirements, or staff resourcing. Benefits could include costs that an operator avoids due to the implementation of the Specific Risk Assessment, which would enable sufficient mitigation and prevention of accidents or incidents that could result in the loss of the aircraft, revenue, reputation or any other assets.

The results of this consultation were intended be used to guide the development of the regulatory changes, refine the AMC and GM and contribute to the assessment of monetary impact to industry.

The consultation of the Policy Proposal ended on 02 May 2025. There were 3 responses to the consultation with requests for the comments provided to be published.

Two responses agreed with the proposed policy and changes.

One response requested clarification on the Policy Proposal and disagreed with the proposed changes, on the basis that these changes would require aircraft cargo compartments to have fire detection and suppression systems. In the commentator’s view, many aircraft in operation lack such systems, and no manufacturer-approved modifications exist to install them. There was additional concern that if compliance to this perceived requirement would not be possible, such aircraft could be effectively grounded, causing significant operational and economic disruptions for operators.

The commentator presented the following solutions:

1. For the UK CAA to reconsider the proposed regulation and introduce specific alleviations for operators of aircraft that cannot feasibly comply.
2. Exemptions or alternative compliance measures could be granted for aircraft below a certain seating capacity (e.g., 19 seats) or a specific maximum take-off mass (MTOM).
3. Instead of requiring cargo fire suppression systems that are not available for these aircraft, operators could incorporate alternative risk mitigation measures into their safety risk assessments.
4. Mitigations could include enhanced baggage screening, stricter restrictions on the types of cargo permitted, verbal confirmations from passengers regarding the contents of their luggage, and other operational procedures to minimise fire risks.

It was considered unreasonable to expect operators to go through the complex and time-consuming process of producing an Alternative Means of Compliance (AltMOC) to continue operating, which could result in aircraft being temporarily grounded while awaiting approval, increasing the administrative burden on both operators and the CAA. Additionally, such operators could possibly not even consider this issue a high-risk concern in their existing safety risk registers, making the AltMOC process an unnecessary regulatory hurdle.

It was suggested that the adoption of a risk-based approach, the regulation could maintain high safety standards while ensuring that aircraft without fire suppression systems are not unfairly grounded due to impractical compliance requirements.

There was also a disagreement on the proposal for the changes to become effective 21 days after publication, as it was perceived as a very short transitional period for the adoption of the changes. 

A concern was raised on the references made in GM1 to ICAO Doc 10102 - Guidance for Safe Operations Involving Aeroplane Cargo Compartments which perceivably focuses on the BOWTIE risk assessment methodology and the possibility of focusing on just one method could lead to an interpretation that this is the only method that will be accepted or expected. 

No comments or feedback was provided on the questions related to costs and benefits of the proposed changes.

1. a) With regard to the request for clarification and expressed disagreement with the proposed changes, the CAA’s response is that other than the systems required by the aircraft certification standards, there are no additional requirements for an aircraft to be equipped with a fire detection or suppression system, nor is there any intention of grounding any type of aircraft.

b) The requirement is that the operator establishes policies and procedures for the transport of items in the cargo compartments that take into consideration both the existence or not of such systems and conducts a risk assessment which includes consideration of any item that is being carried in the aircraft cargo compartment.

c) The policy intent is that whether fire detection and suppression systems are installed or not, when associated with the conduct of a safety risk assessment, it should enable operators to establish policies and design procedures that prevent or mitigate the effects of an uncontrolled fire that can be caused by items being carried in the cargo compartment until it can safely land, whether it be cargo, baggage, or mail.

d) It should be noted that these proposed changes do not introduce any additional regulatory requirements on a Specific Approval granted by the CAA to carry dangerous goods as cargo, under UK Regulation (EU) 965/2012, Annex V, Part-SPA. The conduct of the specific risk assessment mentioned in the proposed policy, is not intended to  replace  compliance with the requirements contained in the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous goods by Air (Doc 9481), whether being carried as cargo or under the provisions for passengers and crew.  

e) If an operator does not hold a specific approval to carry dangerous goods as cargo, the focus of the risk assessment should be on the carriage of anything that can pose a risk of fire, whether it be in cargo other than dangerous goods, baggage or mail.

f) With regard to the mitigation measures proposed by the commentator in paragraphs A. and B. above the CAA would like to clarify that the proposed changes require operators to establish policies and procedures for the carriage of items being carried in the cargo compartment of an aeroplane, which consider the design elements of the cargo compartment of the aircraft and include the conduct of a specific risk assessment that addresses the hazards of the items being carried.

Therefore, on the basis that the proposed changes do not require installation of cargo compartment detection and suppression systems, the suggestion for alleviations or exemptions for operators who cannot feasibly comply, or for aircraft under a specific seatings capacity or MTOW, are not relevant.

For paragraph C. above, the introduction of risk mitigations in the operator’s risk assessments where the aircraft is not equipped with fire detection or suppression systems, is what the changes propose.

In response to paragraph D. baggage screening systems are designed solely for security purposes. The requirements and responsibilities for provision of information to passengers on what they can and cannot carry in their baggage and restrictions on the  carriage of dangerous goods as cargo are addressed in UK Regulation (EU) 965/2012, Annex IV, Part-CAT, Subpart CAT.GEN.MPA.200 and the ICAO Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous goods by Air (Doc 9481), Part 7; (Operators responsibilities) and Part 8; (Provisions for passengers and crew).

Additional requirements on operators’ responsibilities with regards to operations of the aircraft, Compliance Monitoring and Safety Management System, are covered by: UK Regulation (EU) 965/2012, Annex III, Part-ORO, Subpart ORO.GEN.110 and UK Regulation (EU) 965/2012, Annex III, Part-ORO, Subpart ORO.GEN.200 (a)(3) and (6).

g) in response to the paragraph where concerns were raised on the need for an AltMOC, there may be scope for the CAA to slightly amend the wording contained in AMC2, paragraphs (4) and (5) to reduce  the need for submissions of AltMOCs and to ensure that these should only be considered if applicable. However, the use of an alternative means of compliance to those adopted by the CAA, is entirely up to the operator.

h) It is therefore the position of the CAA that no action needs to be taken, other than that mentioned in the above paragraph (g), because in the proposed changes, emphasis is given to a risk-based approach to achieve regulatory compliance in a manner which:

i) will provide operators with operational flexibility to adopt mitigating measures which are proportionate to the risks identified in specific geographic areas of operation and the confidence in the supply chain,

ii) will allow the operator to manage the risks associated with the carriage of lithium batteries when carried with other dangerous goods, and

iii) will allow the operator to proactively improve their safety management system.

2. In the disagreement on the proposed changes becoming effective 21 days after publication of the SI, that CAA agrees that the period is too short and will adopt the suggested transition period of 3 months.

As for the concern raised on the references made to BowTie in ICAO Doc 10102 - Guidance for Safe Operations Involving Aeroplane Cargo Compartments, Doc 10102 is not the only reference for guidance on risk assessment made by the proposed changes. GM1 also references Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual on the conduct of risk assessments. It should be noted that BowTie is a tool designed to map or build a risk picture and designed for the analysis of hazards/threats that can produce an event and an undesired outcome. It is not designed to be used as a risk assessment. The commentator will also note that the risk assessment process is addressed in a separate Chapter of Doc 10102 (Chapter 5). Therefore, the CAA does not feel there is a need to provide further clarification on the Guidance material referenced on the proposed changes.